Energy in the Executive
The framers of our Constitution worried most about the power of the legislature, and for that reason directed much of their attention to checks upon legislative power. Federalists and Anti-Federalists shared a distrust of “the people’s” capacity to govern wisely and well, and also worried about the tendency of elected officials to start governing in their own interests. What Publius referred to as the “imbecility” of the extant system prior to the Constitution Convention largely resulted from the lack of “energy” in the national government, the solution to which, according to Hamilton in Federalist #70, was “energy in the executive” which was “the leading character in the definition of good government.”
The framers of the Constitution feared that popular assemblies, driven by factional majorities, would act too impulsively and contrary to the rights and interests of others. Concerned that action pursued in haste would produce bad consequences, they sought ways to make government more “deliberate.” In our common usage, that word has two meanings depending on how we pronounce it: with the long “a” it means to think through carefully, and with a short “a” it means to move slowly. Both these usages result from the latin root meaning “to weigh down,” related to placing things on a scale. Hamilton acknowledged that “the deliberate sense of the community should govern the conduct of those to whom they trust the management of their affairs,” but that this did not “require an unqualified complaisance to every sudden breeze of passion, or to every transient impulse the people may receive from the arts of men, who flatter their prejudices to betray their interests.”
But how to introduce mechanisms of deliberation that would retain the republican character of the government, for, as Madison wrote in Federalist #39, “no other form would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of America?” Given the universal concern about the tyranny of majorities, the solution had to reside in anti-majoritarian measures. Thus our Constitution contains measures such as the Senate, longer terms in office to help stabilize government against fickle public opinion, the courts, the Electoral College, the Bill of Rights, and so on, all designed to protect the nation against the excesses of popular will.
The executive and the judiciary were to provide checks against the 800-pound gorilla that was Congress. Publius did not want to leave such checking of popular will to just anyone. A certain kind of person was required. Whereas Publius talks very little about the character of legislators, he spends a good deal of time discussing the virtues necessary to persons expected to occupy the executive mansion and the bench.
Hamilton began his reflections on the presidency by acknowledging that some believe “a vigorous executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government.” As we showed above, however, he worried that citizens would get too caught up in the moment and that reason would yield to passion or self-interest. For that reason, elected officials, particularly presidents, often would have to stand against public opinion rather than simply mirror it. A good leader would save “the people from the very fatal consequences of their own mistakes,” should that leader have the “courage and magnanimity enough to serve them [the people] at the peril of their own displeasure.”
Finding such leaders poses no small problem. On the one hand, we’ve noted the suspicious view of human nature among the Constitution’s framers. Men, after all, are not angels. On the other hand, they also believed that “The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust. The elective mode of obtaining rulers is the characteristic policy of republican government.”
Elections in theory serve important roles in keeping government responsive, transparent, and accountable. Yet they hardly seem to work in practice. Whatever Americans today may think about their federal government, “responsive, transparent, and accountable” don't accurately describe it. Why our elections have failed to produce better government is one of the perplexing issues of our age, but surely part of the problem is that we do not select for “wisdom” or “virtue” among the candidates, nor do we attend to ways we might “keep them virtuous.” One of the truisms of holding power is that it doesn’t diminish a person’s character flaws.
In the first 54 of the 85 Federalist essays, Publius pays scant attention to the problem of virtue, but from 55 forward the concept pops up occasionally. Scholars have long believed, rightly, that Publius’ view of virtue is confusing at best. But I think some of the confusion can be cleared up when we realize that Publius understood the difference between people who seemed or pretended to have virtue, and those who actually had it. Publius also thought in far stricter terms about virtue than we do, understanding the difference between an actual virtue (such as charity) and a simulacrum of one (compassion). If we live in an age where we experience a deep and profound confusion about what virtue itself is and what the virtues are, we can hardly expect ourselves to select leaders preeminent in it. Perhaps, however, we can hope that if we can’t properly identify virtue we can still see vice when it stares us in the face, so perhaps selecting the least vicious candidates might be a good start to fulfilling Publius’ dream concerning the promise of republican government.
As Madison observed, “enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm.” Washington’s greatest flaw was his mortality, and critics of the Constitution reasonably worried what the executive would look like once Washington exited the scene. For that reason, Publius warned us against those with “talents for low intrigue” and “the little arts of popularity.” The people may too often be “duped by pretended patriots” (as George Mason called them) or, as Hamilton worried, “by the wiles of parasites and sycophants, by the snares of the ambitious, the avaricious, the desperate,” and those “who seek to possess” power rather than deserve it. If people are so easily led astray by such appeals to passion and interest, by calling forth the worst versions of ourselves, republican government will not long endure.
Discussion Questions:
What sorts of electoral reforms might you suggest as a way of ensuring that our representatives possess wisdom and virtue? Is there a better way of selecting public officials than elections?
How much should experience count for in determining someone’s electability?
How might the framers, in the light of experience, rethink the balance of power between the legislature and the executive? Should we consider reframing the Constitution?
Director of the Ford Leadership Forum, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Foundation
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